Explaining away incompatibilits intuitions. Eilan (Eds.), Agency and self-awareness (pp. The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action. Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness potential): The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Electroencephalography & Clinical Neurophysiology, 54, 322–325. Readiness potentials preceding unrestricted spontaneous pre-planned voluntary acts.
#Common notion definition free
Do we have free will? Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6(8–9), 47–57.
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I dispute the idea that the common view of free will requires conscious willing. In this chapter, I assess arguments that unconscious brain activity is a threat to the common notion of free will. This in turn is taken to indicate that unconscious brain activity is the cause of action and not conscious willing.
A number of studies within the domain of neuroscience have shown that conscious awareness of the decision to perform an action is preceded by unconscious activity in the brain.
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